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Research Paper no. 5/08 
TO COMPLY OR NOT TO COMPLY:  
EVIDENCE ON CHANGES AND FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE CHANGES IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE UK CODE OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Abstract 
 
In the UK, listed companies are required to comply or explain reasons for non-
compliance with the UK code of corporate governance. In this paper, using detailed 
compliance data for a panel of FTSE 350 companies, I first investigate how firms 
change their compliance practices over time.  I then investigate the factors associated 
with these changes. The period covered in this study, that is 2000 to 2003, was 
marked by a sharp decline in the UK stock market, followed by intensive 
merger/acquisition and restructuring activity. It therefore offered a particularly good 
context for studying how firms’ compliance practices change in response to changing 
business conditions. 
I find that firms tend to behave in an opportunistic manner so far as their compliance 
is concerned – becoming more compliant when their prior period stock market 
performance declines and less so with improvements in their operating performance. 
Moreover, I find that mergers and acquisitions (which may be viewed as a somewhat 
aggressive response to a business shock) tend to decrease compliance, whereas 
reorganizations/restructuring (a rather defensive response) tends to increase 
compliance. These findings provide a useful insight about the behaviour of the firms. 
After all, the code was a response to the corporate scandals of the late 1980s and early 
1990s that shook investor confidence in the UK. In some ways it is not surprising then 
to find that companies tend to 'ride the waves' becoming more compliant when the 
going gets tough, and less so as performance improves. Both for companies and their 
investors these findings have important implications. For companies, the message is 
clear – it is consistency in compliance that matters.  For investors, to separate the 
sheep from goat in terms of their compliance, it is important to look at governance 
arrangements beyond a mere year or two. 
Keywords: The Combined Code, corporate governance, compliance index, board 
structure, firm performance, mergers and acquisitions, reorganizations 
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1. Introduction 
In an earlier paper (see Shabbir and Padgett, 2008), we investigate the link between an 
index of non-compliance (hence forth called the Index), with the UK code of 
corporate governance (hence forth called the Code) and firm performance for a panel 
of FTSE 350 companies over the years, 2000 to 2003.  We find greater non-
compliance to lead to lower total shareholder returns in our sample of firms.  In this 
paper I delve deeper into the compliance practices of the same panel of firms.   I first 
examine the changes in the Index and then explore the factors associated with these 
changes.  As the Index relates to non-compliance with the Code’s recommendations 
in terms of the board’s structure and composition, any change in the value of the 
Index would reflect changes in the board
1
. 
Although full details related to the rationale and the construction of the Index are 
discussed in Shabbir and Padgett (2008), I reproduce here the construction to give the 
reader some idea of what the Index covers: 
“The Index is constructed by assigning one point for each aspect of non-compliance 
with either the letter or the spirit of the Code. Thus, the board should be chaired by an 
independent non-executive director (0 if so, 1 if not); the board should consist of one-
third non-executives (0 if so, 1 if not), the majority of whom should be independent (0 
if so, 1 if not); the board should have a senior independent member other than the 
chair, to whom concerns can be conveyed, (0 if so, 1 if not); board should have a 
remuneration, audit and nomination committee (0 for each, 1  for each added if not 
present); the committees should be headed by independent non-executives, (0 if so for 
each, 1 for each if not); the remuneration committee should be composed entirely of 
independent non-executives (0 if so, 1 if not); the audit committee should be 
composed of non-executives only, have majority independent non-executives, (0 if so, 
1 if not); nomination committee be present (0 if so, 1 if not) and finally, the 
nomination committee should be chaired by an independent non-executive, who could 
be the chairman (0 if so, 1 if not).  With this scoring system, a firm’s index score can 
vary between 0 and 12, with 0 indicating perfect compliance and 12 indicating 
complete non-compliance”.  (Reproduced from Shabbir and Padgett, 2008; p. 5) 
2. Setting the context 
The time period covered in this study, i.e. beginning of 2000 to end 2003, is a period 
marked by a stock market downturn followed by a high level of takeover activity in 
                                                 
1
  For full details on the Index, its development and its components, see Shabbir, A. and Padgett, C., 
(2008), The UK Code of Corporate Governance: Relationship between Compliance and Firm 
Performance, Cranfield School of Management, RP 02/08. 
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the UK.   Table 1 gives some details of the level of mergers/acquisitions by UK firms 
of other domestic companies for the years 1998-2003. 
Table 1: Mergers and acquisitions in the UK by UK companies 
Period No. of 
acquisitions/disposals 
Value of 
acquisitions/disposals (£m) 
1998 635 29525 
1999 493 26163 
2000 587 106916 
2001 492 28994 
2002 430 25239 
2003 558 18679 
Source: Office of National Statistics, UK 
As table 1 indicates, the value of mergers and acquisitions rose more than four-fold in 
the year 2000 as compared to the average for the other years in the period.  It is 
perhaps not a coincidence that this sharp increase in takeover activity in 2000 
coincided with the decline in the stock market that began at the end of the first quarter 
of 2000 and lasted up to the end of first quarter, 2003.  It is most likely that this wave 
of takeover activity in 2000 was a response to a fall in stock prices leading to industry 
wide consolidation, involving mergers/acquisitions as well as restructurings. It can be 
argued that corporate governance, by its very nature, becomes more significant at a 
time when markets are turbulent than at a time when markets are generally calm, and 
neither the managers nor the stock holders of the firm are particularly concerned 
about making significant changes in firms’ governance structures including 
compliance with the Code.  This turbulent time period as such, offers a good context 
for studying the changes in the compliance by firms and investigating the factors 
associated with these changes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 3, I review the research on 
corporate boards; section 4 discusses the data and the variables used in the analysis; 
followed by an analysis of the changes in the Index in section 5; descriptive statistics 
on all relevant variables are presented in section 6; section 7 presents the correlation 
matrix for all the variables used in the empirical analysis, which is presented in 
section 8; section 9 summarises and concludes the paper. 
 
3. Research on corporate boards 
Until quite recently, corporate boards were like a ‘black box’, with little 
understanding of how the boards operated or what factors influenced their structure 
and composition.  With the introduction of the code of corporate governance in the 
UK, the structure of the board has become far more transparent over the years.  
Companies reporting since 1993 have been required to disclose in their annual 
statements, full details of their board structure as well as composition, including 
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duality, number of directors, their type, whether executive or non-executive and in the 
case of latter, their extent of independence.  
As more information has become available, it has prompted researchers to undertake 
research on various aspects of corporate boards, including determinants of its 
composition (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Raheja, 2005); and the effectiveness 
of composition in enhancing corporate performance, e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), Bhagat and Black, (1999) and Gillan et al. (2003) in the US and Vafeas and 
Theodorou, (1998) and Weir, Laing and Mcknight, (2002) in the UK.  Most prior 
studies have found no significant relationship between various aspects of board 
structure, composition and firm performance.  A more recent study, Shabbir and 
Padgett, (2008) however finds that greater compliance with the board related 
recommendations of UK code of corporate governance improves firm’s market 
performance.  
While Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Raheja (2005) present respectively, 
empirical and theoretical discussion on the determinants of board structure and 
composition, little research has looked at how the board structure and composition 
changes over time, and what factors affect these changes.  A notable exception is the 
work of Denis and Sarin (1999), who investigate the factors associated with 
significant changes in ownership and board structures in public corporations in the 
US.  Covering a ten year period (1983-1999), they find that contrary to general belief 
(that board structures should be relatively static) they note that significant changes in 
board and ownership structures are not uncommon.   A total of 65% of the sample 
firms in their study, exhibit either a significant change in ownership structure 
(exceeding 5%), in the fraction of outsiders on the board (exceeding 20%), or a 
change in the board size (exceeding 2 members) in any given year.  Consistent with 
the findings of Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), they find that top executive change, 
corporate control threats and prior poor stock price performance, all factors 
representing a business shock, are among the main factors associated with board and 
ownership changes.  
The focus of this study is qualitatively similar to that of Denis and Sarin’s (1999) 
work. It investigates first, how public companies in the UK change their compliance 
with the board related recommendations of code of corporate governance over time, 
and second, what factors affect these changes?  Drawing from the work of Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1988) and Denis and Sarin (1999), I investigate specifically, the 
relation between mergers and acquisitions, reorganizations, and corporate control 
threats, all events which represent a response to a business shock, with changes in 
compliance.  Additionally, given that changes in business conditions can also lead to 
changes in top management, capital structure as well as ownership structure, I explore 
the association of these factors with changes in compliance.  Finally, in line with prior 
research findings, I explore the impact of prior operating and stock market 
performance on compliance. 
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4. Data and variables 
The index of non-compliance covers the years 2000 to 2003 for a panel of FTSE 350 
industrial companies.  Based on the availability of Index values for at least three of 
the four years of the study for a given firm, changes in the Index are available for 115 
companies for 2003 over 2002, 115 for 2002 over 2001 and 107 for 2001 over 2000, 
making a total of 337 firm-year observations.     
In terms of the explanatory variables, data on mergers, acquisitions and 
reorganizations related to companies included in the panel has been collected from 
FTSE.com document entitled “Notes on the FTSE Actuaries Share Indices: United 
Kingdom Series: 2000”, and the same for 2001, and 2002.  This document gives 
information on events leading to changes in the constituents of the FTSE All Share 
Index series.  These events could be mergers, acquisitions, reorganizations, name 
changes, delisting etc.  Based on the data gleaned from these documents for each firm 
for each year, two dummy variables are created which take the value 1 for all firm-
years, if the firm has undergone a merger/acquisition or a reorganization in any of the 
years 2000, 2001 and 2002, one year each preceding the year of the change in the 
Index.   Reorganization in the context of this study mainly means de-mergers/asset 
sales but may also involve other forms of asset restructuring including share 
buybacks. Given that the firms in the current sample are those for which data on the 
Index are available for all four years, these firms by design represent the ones that 
have survived the merger/acquisition, in other words are the acquirers, rather than the 
acquired firms.   
Although there is little prior empirical guidance on the nature of the association 
between merger/acquisition activity and board changes, but assuming that following 
the merger/acquisition, the acquirer would take on its board, some directors from the 
acquired firm, this would lead to an increase in the number of executives and non-
independent non-executives on the boards of the acquirers, thus decreasing 
compliance.  Hence I a priori expect a positive relationship between a 
merger/acquisition event and the change in the Index for a firm.   
Contrary to mergers and acquisitions, reorganizations are events that a firm usually 
undertakes following poor performance or an actual or perceived corporate control 
threat.  Hence, in some ways these are defensive actions and are meant not only to 
improve internal efficiency, but also to send a positive signal to the market and the 
investors that the firm is taking positive steps to improve its performance.  One such 
step being increased compliance.  Hence, I a priori expect a negative relationship 
between any reorganization event and changes in the Index, implying that as a firm 
reorganizes, its Index will fall, with the firm becoming more compliant.    
Prior research suggests that periods of high level of merger/acquisition activity are 
marked by significant changes in the ownership and capital structure of the firms.  I 
therefore investigate the relation between changes in directors’ shareholdings as well 
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as changes in other block holdings with changes in compliance.  Data on significant 
ownership by both directors as well as external block holders (3% and above) has 
been collected from the Waterlow Stock Exchange Year books.  Change in stock 
ownership is then simply recorded as the difference in the percentage values of total 
director and total external block holdings for 2003 over 2002, 2002 over 2001 and 
2001 over 2000.   
In terms of predicting the relationship between changes in director shareholdings and 
changes in the Index, I take guidance from our analysis elsewhere, Shabbir and 
Padgett (2008) wherein we find a significant positive relationship between the Index 
and director share holdings.  This positive relationship could either be due to an 
entrenchment effect if the significant shareholders are executive directors, who don’t 
care about compliance or it could be due to non-independence of non-executives if 
they are also significant shareholders. Hence, I would a priori expect that even if 
significant share holdings of directors decrease to some extent, it would still not lead 
to a decrease in the Index. Accordingly I expect a negative relationship between 
changes in director shareholdings and changes in the Index.  
In terms of the relationship between changes in external block holdings and changes 
in the Index, one would expect that as the holdings of external block holders, mostly 
institutions in the UK, increase, they are likely to exert influence on company boards 
to become more compliant, in other words leading to a fall in the Index.  Hence, I 
expect a negative relationship between changes in block holdings and changes in the 
Index.     
To study the association of the changes in capital structure as measured by changes in 
leverage with changes in the Index, I include the change in the debt to asset ratio of 
the firm over the same period as the change in the Index as an explanatory variable.   
According to agency theory predictions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), leverage can 
act as a bonding mechanism reducing the need for other forms of monitoring, in this 
case compliance, suggesting an a priori positive relationship between the changes in 
leverage and changes in the Index.  In other words suggesting that increase in 
leverage would lead to increase in the Index. 
The corporate control threat experienced by the firms in an industry can be captured 
by the probability of takeover faced by the firms in that industry.  This variable is 
calculated for each year preceding the year of the change in the Index, as a percentage 
value of the total number of firms within the 2-digit FTSE global classification system 
that were taken over in a particular year divided by the total number of firms in that 2-
digit FTSE global classification system that were a part of the FTSE All Share Index, 
at the beginning of that year.   One would a priori expect a negative relationship 
between the probability of takeover variable and changes in the Index, assuming that 
increased threat of takeover would tend to increase compliance, hence a fall in the 
value of the Index.  
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Changes in the CEO are also more likely during periods marked by high level of 
takeover threat, possibly as a defensive measure.  This assumption is supported by the 
significant correlation, not reported here, that is found between the reorganization 
variable and CEO change variable in the bi-variate analysis.  I therefore investigate 
the impact of the changes in CEO on compliance. Data on CEO change is collected 
from the annual reports of the companies.  Annual reports of UK public companies 
report the date of appointment of the CEO to the position hence, a change in that date 
signifies a change in the CEO in that year.   No attempt has been made to distinguish 
whether the change in CEO is forced or otherwise.  A dummy variable is created 
taking a value of 1 for each firm-year if the firm has undergone a change in the CEO 
in either the year 2000, 2001 or 2002.   Based on prior empirical evidence (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1988) I expect a negative relationship between changes in CEO and 
changes in the Index, implying firms to become more compliant following a CEO 
change.  
Following Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) prior operating performance is calculated 
as the change in the firm’s EBIT for the year preceding the year of the change in the 
Index standardised by the book value of assets as of the beginning of the year of the 
EBIT change.   Hence, for Index change for 2001 over 2000, prior operating 
performance would be calculated as the difference in the EBIT as of the end of the 
calendar year 2000 over 1999 divided by the book value of assets as of the end of 
1999, expressed as a percentage.  I also used industry-adjusted values but the initial 
analysis showed no relationship between industry-adjusted prior operating 
performance and changes in the Index, whereas significant correlation was observed 
between a firm’s own prior operating performance and changes in the Index.  
Consequently the analysis that follows uses only the firm’s own change in EBIT.   
Based on prior empirical evidence in the US, (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), I 
expect a positive relationship between the change in EBIT and change in the Index, 
suggesting that prior poor operating performance would lead to a fall in the Index. 
Prior stock price performance is measured by the previous year 12-month return on 
the stock relative to the year of the change in the Index.  Hence for change in the 
Index for 2001 over 2000, prior period stock return would be calculated simply as the 
difference in the stock price from end 2000 over end 1999, divided by the price at the 
end of 1999 and then expressed as a percentage.  Again, I initially used industry-
adjusted values of stock returns but these were found to be statistically insignificant.  
Hence the following analysis uses the firm’s own prior period stock return.   
Following Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), I also include firm age as an explanatory 
variable which may affect changes in compliance. Age not only represents the culture 
and history of the firm, but can itself affect the evolution of a firm’s board, as older 
firms are likely to have board members with longer tenures, and other features which 
might affect their compliance. 
  8 
5.  Analysis of the changes in the Index 
I start by an analysis of the changes in the Index. This analysis will give us an insight 
into how board structure and composition has changed in our panel of firms over the 
four years of the study.  As Table 2 indicates, relatively few firms experienced a 
change in their Index values for the year 2001 over 2000, with the largest proportion 
(45%) of firms having stable ratings. In contrast, for 2002 over 2001 the largest 
proportion (48%) is of the firms showing a decline in their rating, in other words 
becoming more compliant.  This trend however has reversed markedly in 2003 with 
the largest proportion of the total that is 40% of the firms becoming less compliant in 
this period.  
Table 2: Changes in the Index 
Year 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 
Type of Change No. of Firms  No. of Firms   No. of Firms 
Increasing 15   (14%) 19   (16%) 46   (40%) 
Decreasing 44   (41%) 55   (48%) 30   (26%) 
Stable 48   (45%) 41   (36%) 39   (34%) 
Total No. of Firms 107 (100%) 115 (100%) 115 (100%) 
To gain a deeper understanding of the behaviour of the firms in terms of their 
compliance/non-compliance, I next analyse the frequency of non-compliance of the 
firms with each component of the Index for each of the four years of the study.  This 
will give us an insight into which recommendations of the Code are the firms most 
compliant or non-compliant with and how this behaviour is changing over time.   
As Table 3 indicates, 62 out of 107 firms in 2000 i.e. about 58% of the sample had 
either an executive or a non-independent non-executive as the chairman of the board.  
This declined to 39% (45 out of 115) in 2003.  It appears then that more firms are now 
appointing independent non-executives as chairman of the board.  Other areas in 
which firms have become more compliant in 2003 over 2000 are in having a deputy 
chairman or senior non-executive on the board; having more independent 
remuneration committees; and putting in place a nomination committee chaired by an 
independent non-executive.  One important area, however, in which compliance has 
not increased is in the composition of audit committees.  
It is also important to note that the trend in compliance in all the above mentioned 
aspects has reversed in the year 2003.  It may not be a coincidence that the stock 
market also showed a reversal of trend in 2003 and with the economy picking up and 
companies experiencing rising profitability, they may have become less concerned 
about compliance as an issue. I will investigate this point further in the subsequent 
cross-sectional regressions.   
On the whole, the preceding analysis suggests that compliance, which in turn 
represents changes in the board, has not been very stable over time.  This finding is 
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consistent with the earlier evidence of Denis and Sarin (1999) in the US, who also 
find boards to be not as stable as generally assumed, especially during turbulent times.  
Firms it appears continuously reassess their board structures in the light of internal 
and external developments and adjust them accordingly.    
Table 3: Cross sectional frequency of non-compliance for each component of the Index 
Year Chair 
E/N 
% of 
NEDs 
% of  
INED 
DC/ 
SNED 
RC 
Y/N 
 
Chair 
RC 
Comp. 
RC 
AC 
Y/N 
 
Chair 
AC 
Comp. 
AC 
NC 
Y/N 
Chair 
NC 
2000 62 
(58%)  
3 (3%) 8 
 (7%) 
53 
(50%) 
1 
(1%) 
8 
(7%) 
41 
(38%) 
1 
(1%) 
9 
(8%) 
11 
(10%) 
12 
(11%) 
31 
(29%) 
2001 56 
(49%) 
2 (2%) 14 
(12%) 
39 
(34%) 
0 
(0%) 
16 
(14%) 
37 
(32%) 
0 
(0%) 
8 
(7%) 
6 
(5%) 
7 
(6%) 
22 
(19%) 
2002 38 
(33%) 
2 (2%) 9  
(8%) 
24 
(21%) 
0 
(0%) 
7 
(6%) 
18 
(16%) 
0 
(0%) 
8 
(7%) 
9 
(8%) 
9 
(8%) 
12 
(10%) 
2003 45 
(39%) 
0 
(0%) 
11 
(10%) 
39 
(33%) 
0 
(0%) 
6 
(5%) 
33 
(29%) 
0 
(0%) 
8 
(7%) 
12 
(10%) 
1 
(1%) 
17 
(15%) 
Total No. of Firms: 107 for 2000; 115 for 2001; 115 for 2002; 115 for 2003.  Proportion of firms not 
complying with each component of the Index for each year expressed to the nearest whole percentage 
is given in brackets.  
6.  Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis 
except for the dummy variables, as these do not represent the actual values for 
mergers / acquisitions, or reorganization for each year of the study, given that a 
dummy is recorded for each year, if the firm underwent merger/reorganization in any 
one year.  However to give the reader an idea of the level of such activity in the 
current sample, thirteen firms had major acquisitions over the sample period, while 
seven had undergone some form of asset restructuring/reorganization.  In addition, 
thirteen firms had a change in their CEO over the period.  For other variables, I 
discuss both the mean and the median values, as in a sample of limited size where 
some variables exhibit substantial standard deviation, the median is more meaningful 
than the mean which can be unduly affected by the outliers.  
As Table 4 indicates, the mean age of a firm in the sample is 46 years, while the 
median is 33 years. It appears that the average age of the firm in the current sample is 
greater than that of the firms in Denis and Sarin’s (1999) US study.  The difference 
could be due to the fact that the current sample consists of large firms which are part 
of the FTSE 350 Index, while Denis and Sarin’s sample consists of firms of all sizes 
quoted on the NYSE, Amex or Nasdaq.   
Taken over the entire period (2000-2003), the firms in the sample show a declining 
trend in the Index, with a mean change of -0.23 point and a median of zero.  Over the 
entire period (1999-2002), both the mean and median values of stock return have been 
similar and negative being -10.05% and -10.54% respectively.  The trend in the stock 
returns is consistent with the overall climate of the period being marked by a falling 
  10 
stock market.  In terms of individual years, the decline has been the greatest for 2002 
over 2001, with a mean (median) of -23.53%, (-21.07%), while still negative but 
relatively less for 2001 over 2000 with a mean (median) of -4.47% and (-4.76%).  The 
mean stock return for 2000 over 1999 however, is positive (1.54%) while the median 
is negative (-3.84%).    
The operating performance (EBIT change) on the other hand shows a substantial 
difference in the mean and median values over the entire period (1999-2002), being -
0.08% and 1.0% respectively.  The median in this case becomes more relevant, given 
that there was a large variation in the values for individual firms, with a minimum of -
278.81% to a maximum of 75.87%.  In terms of individual years also, the trend is 
similar for changes in operating performance, with completely opposite values for 
mean and median, being -0.5% and 0.5% respectively for 2002 over 2001 and for 
2001 over 2000, -0.45% and 0.76%, although these have a consistent sign for 2000 
over 1999, being 0.75% and 2.3% respectively.  The variation in means and medians 
suggest that overall there was considerable variation in changes in operating 
performance for individual firms in the year 2002 over 2001 and 2001 over 2000, 
whereas the trend as a whole was more consistent for all firms for 2000 over 1999, 
being generally positive.     
Change in director shareholdings is negative when considered over the entire period, 
with a mean of -0.23% and a median of zero and also for each of the individual years, 
with the highest mean change in holdings occurring in 2002 over 2001 of -0.48%.  It 
appears then, that on average director shareholdings have been decreasing over the 
period 2000 to 2003.   Considered over the entire period, change in external block 
holdings is positive, with a mean of 1.59% and a median of 0.89%.  The trend is also 
the same for each of the individual years, with the highest change in external block 
holdings occurring in the year 2002 over 2001, with a mean of 4.38% and a median of 
3.01%.  The differences in the trends of changes in director and block shareholdings 
suggest that directors, who have less diversified personal wealth, tend to be more risk 
averse and reduce risk by selling shares in periods of falling stock prices. Block 
holders who are mostly institutions in the UK, on the contrary, having much greater 
diversification and appetite for risk, tend to increase their shareholdings, taking 
advantage of the falling prices.  It is also worth noting that the negative change in 
director shareholdings could also be associated with changes in top management, 
merger/acquisition and restructuring activities.   
Taken over the entire period (2000-2003), leverage measured by the debt to asset ratio 
has increased for the firms in the sample by a mean of 1%, with a median of zero.  
The change however varies over the individual years, with debt to asset ratio having a 
mean (median) of -1% (0.00) in 2003 over 2002 and a positive mean (median) of 2% 
(1%) in 2002 over 2001 and a mean (median) of 3% (2%) in 2001 over 2000.  These 
trends are consistent with theoretical expectations based on the pecking order theory 
that companies are likely to take on more debt during periods of declining 
profitability, as was the case for the firms in the period from 2000 to 2002.  The 
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highest positive mean change (3%) in debt to asset ratio in 2001 over 2000 is also 
consistent with the fact that most mergers/acquisitions took place in 2000.  Assuming 
that cash may have been borrowed to finance these acquisitions, it is likely to be one 
of the important factors contributing to the rise in firms’ debt to asset ratios in 2001.  
Supporting this assumption, is the finding by Thomson Financial cited in Sudarsanam 
(2003) that in the year 2000, 109 acquisitions were financed by cash as compared to 
29 by equity and 26 by mixed financing.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis  
(excluding dummy variables) 
Variable Indexchng Age Return Ebitchng Chngdh Chngbh Chngda Pbtov 
Year 2000-2003 2000-
2003 
1999-
2002 
1999- 
2002 
2000- 
2003 
2000- 
2003 
2000- 
2003 
2000- 
2003 
Mean -0.23 45.52 -10.05 -0.08 -0.23 1.59 0.01 4.31 
Median 0.00 33.00 -10.54 1.00 0.00 0.89 0.00 2.50 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.51 36.21 34.21 18.16 6.37 11.68 0.10 5.53 
Minimum -5.00 1.00 -92.08 -278.81 -79.65 -59.71 -0.49 0.00 
Maximum 6.00 164.00 122.57 75.87 53.27 63.27 0.45 40.00 
Year 2002-2003 2002- 
2003 
2001- 
2002 
2001- 
2002 
2002-
2003 
2002-
2003 
2002-
2003 
2002-
2003 
Mean 0.34 46.00 -23.53 -0.50 -0.11 0.04 -0.01 2.71 
Median 0.00 33.00 -21.07 0.50 0.00 -0.15 0.00 2.50 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.52 36.42 27.19 6.64 9.83 10.57 0.08 3.18 
Minimum -5.00 2.00 -89.39 -26.87 -79.65 -39.15 -0.21 0.00 
Maximum 6.00 164.00 86.57 13.42 53.27 30.31 0.30 11.11 
Year 2001-2002 2001-
2002 
2000-
2001 
2000- 
2001 
2001-
2002 
2001-
2002 
2001-
2002 
2001-
2002 
Mean -0.59 45.00 -4.47 -0.45 -0.48 4.38 0.02 4.15 
Median 0.00 32.00 -4.76 0.76 0.00 3.01 0.01 2.08 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.39 36.42 33.37 11.69 4.49 12.77 0.09 5.61 
Minimum -4.00 1.00 -92.08 -71.49 -31.76 -59.71 -0.20 0.00 
Maximum 4.00 163.00 102.16 43.37 21.79 63.27 0.45 25.00 
Year 2000-2001 2000-
2001 
1999- 
2000 
1999- 
2000 
2000-
2001 
2000-
2001 
2000-
2001 
2000-
2001 
Mean -0.45 45.55 1.54 0.75 -0.08 0.27 0.03 6.21 
Median 0.00 36.00 -3.84 2.30 0.00 0.58 0.02 5.88 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.48 36.08 37.59 29.16 1.67 11.14 0.12 6.76 
Minimum -5.00 1.00 -87.88 -278.81 -6.39 -33.23 -0.49 0.00 
Maximum 3.00 162.00 122.57 75.87 11.69 34.16 0.42 40.00 
In table 4, Indexchng stands for index change, Ebitchng stands for EBIT change, Chngdh is change in 
director holdings, Chngbh is change in block holdings, and Chngda is the change in debt to asset ratio. 
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6. Correlation matrix 
Given in Table 5 are the full sample and cross sectional correlations of the changes in 
the Index with each of the explanatory variable.  
Table 5:  Full sample and cross-sectional Pearson correlation of Index change 
with all the explanatory variables (p-values are in parenthesis) 
Variable Full Sample  2002-2003 2001-2002 2000-2001 
Reorganization -.082 (.131) -.226 (.015)** -.047 (.618) .007 (.942) 
Merger/acquisition .116 (.034)** .299 
(.001)*** 
.046 (.627) .001 (.988) 
CEO change -.110 (.043)** -.027 (.771) -.178 (.057)* -.131 (.178) 
EBIT change .030 (.581) .236 (.011)** -.117 (.213) .056 (.569) 
Return -.033 (.546) -.079 (.399) .080 (.396) .135 (.165) 
Age .055 (.316) .204 (.029)** -.125 (.185) .081 (.409) 
Prob. of  takeover -.070 (.200) -.107 (.255) -.131 (.163) .120 (.219) 
Change in DA .067 (.220) .029 (.760) .237 (.011)** .097 (.319) 
Change in DH -.098 (.074)* -.151 (.106)* -.153 (.103)* .139 (.155) 
Change in BH -.005 (.923) .062 (.508) .023 (.809) .013 (.895) 
 ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
The above table shows that for the full sample, the changes in the Index are 
significantly positively correlated with mergers and acquisitions, and significantly 
negatively correlated with CEO change and change in directors’ shareholdings.  This 
suggests that generally, firms which engage in mergers and acquisitions tend to 
become less compliant, perhaps because they experience an initial rise in operating 
and/or stock market performance, following the merger which tends to make them 
less concerned about compliance or more simply, because they take on more non-
independent directors on board from the company taken over or merged. Although not 
reported here but the correlation between mergers/acquisition variable and the stock 
return variable shows an insignificant but positive relationship for the year 1999- 
2000, (2000 was the year when most of the mergers and acquisitions took place) 
followed by an insignificant but negative relationship in the two subsequent years.  
This suggest, that firms which engaged in mergers/acquisitions enjoyed positive stock 
return in the year prior to when merger/acquisition took place followed by a negative 
relationship in the two subsequent years.  This trend is consistent with the results of 
earlier studies, notably, Frank, Harris and Titman (1991), and Travlos (1987) who 
find that acquirers tend to experience a decline in the longer term stock market 
performance following the merger/acquisition.  
The negative correlation in the full panel between changes in the Index and CEO 
change suggests that with a new CEO on board firms become more compliant, 
perhaps inducting more non-executives with increased need for oversight of the new 
CEO.  A decrease in shareholdings of the directors leading to increase in the Index 
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(negative correlation) i.e. decreased compliance suggests that there is lower alignment 
of the interest of the inside and outside shareholders as the stake of insiders falls.  
The individual year cross sectional correlations indicate different factors to be 
influencing changes in compliance in different years.  In 2001-2002, reorganization 
and CEO change appear to be associated with a decrease in the Index while 
merger/acquisitions, change in operating performance and age of the firm appear to be 
positively associated with the Index change.  The positive association between debt to 
asset ratio and   Index change in 2001-2002 suggests that firms which took on more 
debt became less compliant with higher debt possibly acting as an alternative control 
mechanism consistent with the agency theory predictions.  Newer CEOs tend to 
increase compliance in 2001-2002.  For 2000-2001, it appears that none of the factors 
have any significant impact on compliance.  It is worth noting that there was in effect, 
the least change in the Index during this period, as is evident from Table 1 above 
which shows 45% of the firms to have stable ratings over this period.  It appears 
therefore, that most changes in the Index occurred in 2003 over 2002 and 2002 over 
2001.   
8.   Empirical analysis 
Given that the firms exhibit a varying trend in compliance over time, it makes sense to 
study first the cross section of changes in the Index and explore what factors are 
associated with these changes for each year from 2000 to 2003.    
Accordingly the model I test is the following,    
Index change = constant +β1 reorganization + β2 merger/acquisition + β3 CEO 
Change + β4 age + β5 return-1 + β6  EBIT change-1+ β7 probability of takeover +  
β8 change in director shareholdings + β9 change in external block holdings +  
β10 change in leverage  + ε 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 present the results of the cross sectional regressions.  I report results 
based on both regular OLS and White’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors, as 
regressions for some years show signs of heteroscedasticity.    Table 6 shows 
reorganizations, mergers/acquisitions, age of the firm and change in prior operating 
performance, to have a significant association with the changes in the Index for 2002-
2003.   
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Table 6: Cross–sectional Regression Analysis for 2002-2003 
        Dependent variable is the change in the Index 
Explanatory Variables Full Model for 
2002-2003 
Based on 
White’s S.E.’s 
Constant -0.27 (-0.94) -0.27 (-0.94) 
Reorganization -1.62 (-2.76)*** -1.62 (-1.77)* 
Merger/acquisition 1.27 (3.19)*** 1.27 (2.48)*** 
CEO change 0.19 (0.45) 0.19 (0.57) 
Age 0.01 (2.92)*** 0.01 (2.66)*** 
Return-1 -0.01 (-1.47) -0.01 (-1.83)* 
EBIT change-1 0.05 (2.58)*** 0.05 (2.81)*** 
Probability of  
Takeover 
-0.03 (-0.80) -0.03 (-0.87) 
Change in director 
Holdings 
-0.01 (-0.84) -0.01 (-0.47) 
Change in block 
Holdings 
-0.01 (-0.66) -0.01 (-0.67) 
Change in debt to  
asset ratio  
1.02 (0.65) 1.02 (0.73) 
R-Squared 0.27 0.27 
R-Bar-Squared 0.20 0.20 
No. of Observations 115 115 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
However, the nature of the association varies for different factors.  Whereas 
mergers/acquisitions tend to increase the Index, i.e. decrease compliance, 
reorganizations appear to decrease the Index, in other words increase compliance.  
These results are quite consistent with a priori expectations, assuming that firms 
which merge/acquire other firms most probably take on more non-independent, non-
executives from the acquired firm.  This would tend to make boards less independent 
leading to a decrease in compliance.  This explanation is further supported by the 
findings of table 3 which shows significant increase in non-independent or executive 
chair on the board (rising from 38 in 2002 to 45 in 2003).  The number of non-
independent members on remuneration committee has also almost doubled over the 
period, rising from 18 in 2002 to 33 in 2003, along with a significant increase in the 
non-independent members on audit committee as well as chairs of nomination 
committee.  
Reorganizations, on the contrary, which are also a response to business shock, tend to 
increase compliance.  This result is consistent with the argument that reorganizations, 
involving asset sales, share buy backs or any other form of restructuring are a 
defensive reaction to a business shock and hence, and like another defensive action 
such as a change in CEO, tend to make firms more compliant.  Moreover, asset sales 
tend to decrease the executive directors on the boards, especially those linked to the 
assets disposed off, thus decreasing the number of executive directors on the board in 
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line with making boards more independent. This argument is supported by the results 
of the bivariate correlations (not reported here) which show a strong correlation 
between reorganizations and CEO change, suggesting that firms which dispose of 
their assets,  also tend to change their CEOs.  
Age of the firm is an indicator of a firm’s history and culture as well as of the type of 
industry a firm belongs to.  The results for 2002-2003 show a strong positive 
association between firm age and the changes in the Index.  It appears that compliance 
decreases with firm age that is older firms which are likely to be in more established, 
mature industries tend to be less compliant.  An alternative and more likely 
explanation is simply that the older a firm, the greater the probability that it is going 
to have both executive as well as non-executive directors with longer tenures, thus 
decreasing compliance.   
It is interesting to note the positive relationship between prior period change in 
operating performance and the change in the Index for 2002-2003.  The positive 
association suggests that as firms experienced rising profitability in 2002 over 2001, 
they tended to become less compliant during 2002-2003.  This finding is consistent 
with my earlier stated assertion, that firms may become less concerned with 
compliance as the general business outlook improves, with improvements in operating 
performance preceding the upturn in stock market performance.  
Table 7:  Cross-sectional regression analysis for 2001-2002 
Dependent variable is Index change 
Explanatory Variables Full Model for 
2001-2002 
Based on  
White’s S.E.’s 
Constant -0.35 (-1.53) -0.35 (-1.6) 
Reorganization -0.32 (-0.59) -0.32 (-0.51) 
Merger/acquisition  0.26 (0.68)  0.26 (0.57) 
CEO change -0.66 (-1.51)  -0.66 (-1.42) 
Age -0.003 (-1.04)  -0.003 (-1.13) 
Return-1  0.01 (2.10)**   0.01 (2.46)*** 
EBIT change-1 -0.01 (-1.71)*  -0.01 (-1.69)* 
Probability of  
Takeover 
-0.03 (-1.41)  -0.03 (-1.27) 
Change in director 
Holdings 
-0.05 (-1.77)*  -0.05 (-3.03)*** 
Change in block 
Holdings 
 0.01 (0.74) 0.01 (1.11) 
Change in debt to  
asset ratio  
 3.69 ( 2.69)*** 3.69 (3.24)*** 
R-Squared 0.18 0.18 
R-Bar-Squared 0.10 0.10 
No. of Observations 115 115 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
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Contrary to expectations, the analysis for 2002-2003 shows no significant relationship 
between the changes in the Index and CEO change, prior stock market performance, 
takeover threat, change in director share holdings, change in external block holdings 
and change in leverage.   
Given that the overall changes in the Index have been positive for 2003 over 2002, (as 
in Table 3) it indicates that the net affect of the factors which tend to increase the 
Index namely rising profitability, mergers/acquisitions and age has been greater than 
that of reorganization which tends to decrease the Index.  
I now turn to an analysis of the results for 2001-2002.  Table 7 above indicates prior 
period stock return, changes in director share holdings and changes in leverage as 
measured by the debt to asset ratio, to be the most significant factors in explaining 
changes in the Index in 2002 over 2001.  The highly significant and positive 
relationship between changes in the Index and stock market performance in this 
period appears to be consistent with the prevailing downward trend in the stock 
market making firms more compliant.  It appears that with the fall in the stock prices 
continuing in 2001, a trend which started in early 2000, and the sudden jump in the 
level of merger activity around the period (2000-2001), led firms to become more 
compliant in 2002 perhaps as part of a larger process of rationalisation.   An argument 
consistent with the signalling theory,  that  during periods of adverse business 
conditions, greater compliance  may act as a signal that firms are working in the 
interest of the shareholders.  
A closer look at Table 2 strengthens the preceding argument.  As the table shows 
there was a significant decrease in the number of non-independent or executive chairs 
in 2002 over 2001 (from 56 to 38) as well as increase in compliance in other areas 
such as putting in place a deputy chair or a senior non-executive (39 to 24), as well as 
significant decrease in the non-independent directors on remuneration committee, as 
well as chairs of nomination committee.  
The weakly significant and negative relationship between prior period operating 
performance and change in the Index for 2001-2002 suggests that some firms may 
have remained non-compliant in 2002 even after suffering a fall in their operating 
performance in 2000-2001. 
The negative relationship between changes in director shareholdings and changes in 
the Index is consistent with expectations and suggests that in companies where the 
directors are significant shareholders, even a fall in their shareholdings would not lead 
to a fall in the Index, in other words, an increase in compliance.  Also, significant 
shareholdings by directors constitute an element of non-independence according to 
the Code, hence in companies where directors particularly non-executives are 
significant shareholders, compliance is unlikely to rise.    
The highly significant and positive relationship between changes in leverage and 
change in compliance in this period is consistent with the predictions of the agency 
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theory that higher leverage can act as a substitute for other monitoring mechanisms- 
compliance in this case. In the context of the current analysis, this finding is also 
consistent with the explanation that firms may be financing cash acquisitions by 
borrowing during periods of high level of merger/acquisition activity, thus reducing 
compliance. 
Contrary to expectations, the analysis for 2001-2002 shows no significant relationship 
between the changes in the Index and reorganization, merger/acquisition, CEO 
change, takeover threat, change in external block holdings and change in leverage. 
Given that for 2002 the change in the Index was generally negative, it suggests that 
the impact of factors which decreased the Index was overall greater than those which 
increased the Index.  
Table 8: Cross-sectional regression analysis for 2000-2001 
           Dependent variable is Index change 
Explanatory Variables Full Model for 
2001-2000 
Based on 
White’s S.E.’s 
Constant -0.61 (-2.18)** -0.61 (-1.98)** 
Reorganization  0.39 (0.64)  0.39 (0.56) 
Merger/acquisition  0.02 (0.05)  0.02 (0.04) 
CEO change -0.59 (-1.38) -0.59 (-1.70)* 
Age  0.37E-3 (0.08)  0.37E-3 (0.08) 
Return-1  0.00 (1.00)  0.00 (1.19)  
EBIT change-1  0.00 (1.00)  0.00 (1.82)* 
Probability of  
Takeover 
 0.02 (1.22)  0.02 (1.05)  
Change in director 
Holdings 
 0.08 (0.89)  0.08 (0.76) 
Change in block 
Holdings 
 0.96E-3 (0.07)  0.96E-3 (0.07) 
Change in debt to  
asset ratio  
 1.37 (1.08) 1.37 (1.14) 
R-Squared  0.08 0.08 
R-Bar-Squared -0.01 -0.01 
No. of Observations  107 107 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
I now turn to the analysis for 2000-2001.  As can be seen from Table 8 other than the 
change in the CEO and change in prior operating performance, none of the other 
explanatory variables have a significant relationship with the changes in the Index for 
the year 2001 over 2000. Nevertheless the significant results are consistent with 
expectations, indicating that compliance increases, that is, the Index falls when a firm 
undergoes a change in the CEO.  Moreover, consistent with expectations, the positive 
relationship between the change in prior operating performance and the change in the 
Index indicates that as firms’ performance declined in the period 2000 over 1999, they 
tended to become more compliant in 2001.   This result is also consistent with the 
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results for 2001-2002, with firms continuing to increase compliance in 2002 with 
continued decline in operating and stock market performance in 2001.  
Taken together, the cross sectional results for the changes in the Index over the three 
years suggest different factors to be influencing the changes in the Index over 
different time periods.  An important result to note from the above analysis is the 
different response of firms to changes in operating and stock market performance.  
The results suggest that improvements in operating performance, which tend to 
precede improvements in stock market performance, tend to make firms less 
compliant while declining trends in stock market returns, which would inevitably 
follow declines in operating performance, tend to make firms more compliant.  These 
results are entirely consistent with my argument that firms would tend to become 
more compliant in troubled times and less compliant with improvements in operating 
and stock market performance.  
Given that certain variables especially changes in CEO, reorganizations and 
mergers/acquisitions have a consistent trend in terms of their effect on compliance in 
all cross-sectional regressions, it would be interesting to investigate the association of 
these factors with Index changes over the entire sample period.  Presented below are 
the results of three models relating changes in the Index to the various explanatory 
variables for the full sample.   As these results do not show evidence of 
heteroscedasticity, they are not adjusted for White’s standard errors.  Two year 
dummies are added to capture the effect of variation in time.  
Model 1 in Table 9 below is the full model over the entire period. As expected, most 
variables in this model show an association with changes in Index as expected, except 
for the performance related variables which have no significant coefficient nor have 
any statistical significance when considered over the full sample.  The latter finding is 
not surprising given that performance variables have provided varying incentives for 
changes in compliance in different years.  I therefore drop these two variables in 
model 2 and additionally, drop age and changes in block holdings in model 3, with 
almost no impact on the significance of the remaining variables as well as on the R-
bar-squared suggesting that these variables have no explanatory power.  
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Table 9: Regression analysis for the full sample 2000-2003 
           Dependent variable is Index change 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Y1  0.56 (3.2)***  0.47 (2.91)*** 0.47 (3.24)*** 
Y2 -0.48 (-2.95)*** -0.50 (-3.07)*** -0.49 (-3.30)*** 
Reorganization -0.45 (-1.32) -0.48 (-1.41) -0.49 (-1.51) 
Merger/acquisition  0.41 (1.70)*  0.38  (1.59) 0.38 (1.61)* 
CEO change -0.51 (-2.06)** -0.56 (-2.25)** -0.54 (-2.22)** 
EBIT change  0.00 (0.81)   
Return  0.00 (1.30)    
Age -0.40E-3 (-0.20) -0.78E-3 (-0.03) - 
Probability of  
Takeover 
-0.02 (-1.87)* -0.02 (-1.79)* -0.02 (-1.97)** 
Change in director 
Holdings 
-0.02 (-1.65)*  -0.02 (-1.66)* -0.02 (-1.67)* 
Change in block 
Holdings 
 0.00 (0.52)  -0.00 (0.44) - 
Change in debt to  
asset ratio  
 1.52 (1.89)*  1.28 (1.63)* 1.28 (1.64)* 
R-Squared 0.11 0.10 0.10 
R-Bar-Squared 0.08 0.08 0.09 
No. of Observations 337 337 337 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
As expected, all other variables in all 3 models have an association with changes in 
the Index in the expected direction and consistent with cross-sectional results.    
Reorganization being a defensive action, although marginally insignificant, tends to 
decrease the Index, in other words increasing compliance while mergers and 
acquisitions, which one can view as a more aggressive form of reaction to business 
shocks, tend to increase the Index, or decrease compliance.  
Changes in CEO, irrespective of the reason leading to the change, tend to increase 
compliance.  The negative relationship between director shareholdings and changes in 
the Index, suggests that firms with significant shareholders on the board would remain 
less compliant, even if shareholdings of directors fall, an argument consistent with 
entrenchment hypothesis.   
The overall positive relationship between changes in the Index and leverage suggests 
as firms take on more leverage perhaps to finance acquisitions, compliance falls. 
Another important result to note over the full sample period is the statistically 
significant relationship of the probability of takeover variable. Its negative 
relationship with the changes in the Index, most probably captures the overall climate 
of the period, being marked by high level of takeover threat leading firms to generally 
become more compliant over the period.  
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9.  Summary, conclusions and implications 
In this study I accomplish two objectives: First, I investigate how firms change their 
compliance practices over time and second, I analyse the possible factors motivating 
these changes.  Given that the period covered in this study presented a time when the 
stock market was falling, it offers a particularly rich context for evaluating how firms 
respond to turbulent times, particularly in terms of changing their governance 
arrangements.  We know that the Code itself was a response to the crisis of 
confidence facing the UK industry in the late 1980s.  The early years of this century, 
that is early 2000 to early 2003 when the stock market was falling in the UK, with 
investor confidence again weakening, then offered a good context to study how the 
firms responded in terms of their compliance to these changing business conditions.   
Did firms become more compliant following a fall in their operating and/or stock 
market performance?  My findings indicate that generally, firms did become more 
compliant following the decline in their market as well as operating performance 
during this period.  Nevertheless, my findings indicate a somewhat opportunistic 
response of firms in terms of changes in compliance according to the change in their 
performance. Cross sectional analysis of the changes in compliance for the years 
2002-2003 and 2001-2002 indicate that as firms’ operating performance improved in 
2003 they became less compliant whereas with the fall in their prior period stock 
return in 2001, compliance increased in 2002.  These findings suggest that firms may 
use compliance as a signal about their reputation and character - becoming more 
compliant during troubled times, when companies and their investors alike would be 
more concerned about governance; while becoming less compliant when things start 
getting better. 
Given that countries around the world are increasingly adopting the code approach to 
governance, these findings have important implications both for companies as well as 
their investors, and not just in the UK.  For companies, it suggests that maintaining 
the image of a well governed company would require more than a transient change in 
governance arrangements.  For investors, to separate the sheep from the goat in terms 
of their governance arrangements, they need to look at a firm’s record of sound 
governance arrangements for a period longer than a mere year or two!    
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